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Abstract
This paper analyzes the emerging literature on the determinants
of giving within a social network. We propose two main explanatory
variables for previous experimental results on the friendship effect.
The first is social integration, which has a positive impact on giv-
ing. The second variable is strategic and is based on reciprocity: the
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possibility of ex-post favors. Econometric analysis shows that both
variables play a positive (and significant) role.
Keywords: giving, social networks, reciprocity, social integration.
JEL Class.: C91, D64, Z13.
1 Motivation
The role of socialization in altruistic behavior is a growing topic in experi-
mental literature. Seminal papers in this field (Hoffman et al. [16] and [17]
or Bohnet & Frey [1]) explore the effect of “social distance” on giving, i.e.
how the subjects’ perception of the recipient as close or distant, in moral
terms, affects the outcome; the result is that proximity plays a crucial role in
explaining generosity. Although the first papers on this issue interpreted this
social aspect as a matter of framing, a number of subsequent papers have
dealt with pure social issues focussing on the attributes of recipients.
This literature started with Eckel & Grossman [11], who analyzed how in-
dividuals behave when the recipient is a well—known and reputed institution:
the Red Cross. This line of research regarding the recipient’s identity con-
tinued with Burham [6], who endow dictators with pictures of the recipients,
Charness & Gneezy [9], who give recipients’ names to proposers, and Brañas-
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Garza [2], who inform dictators about recipients’ poverty levels. The research
dealing with social framing includes also Frohlich et al. [13] who analyzes
how the presence of recipients (in front of dictators) increases the credibil-
ity of the experiment and social proximity and, thus, giving. As shown in
Hoffman et al. [16] proximity between the participants and the experimenter
and between subjects is a key variable in explaining social behavior. In fact
when the two variables are reduced to the minimun, giving approximates
the game theoretical prediction, i.e. zero (see Camerer [7], Frohlich, Oppen-
heimer & Kurki [12] and Meier [19] for more detailed expositions of dictator
game results).
However, the social side of altruism is not yet well understood. Although
the number of experimental papers studying altruism is overwhelming, there
are very few articles connecting social networks1 and generous behavior. Note
that the social side of altruism, if it matters at all, affects a key question:
if altruism is socially based then any policy increasing interactions between
individuals could be used as a device for promoting cooperation.2 In this
1A recent survey on network literature is Jackson [18].
2These ideas could be applied in the area of human resources management. If altruism
is desirable within a firm, and provided experimental literature can show that altruism is
socially based, then organizing social acivities for the weekend would be a good business
idea.
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paper we address this issue in the light of existing experimental evidence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we examine
previous work on the relationship between social networks and giving and
present empirical regularities across experiments. It turns out that the ev-
idence is somewhat contradictory. Therefore, in Section 3 we analyze the
features which may explain the differences in the results and test our conjec-
tures with a regression analysis. In Section 4 we discuss our main conclusion:
reciprocity and social integration are the main determinants of giving.
2 Social networks: an emerging literature
The starting point of this literature is a well established experimental result:
the larger the social distance the smaller the level of donations (see Hoffman
et al. [16]). Recently, there has been a stream of papers seeking a comple-
mentary result (that which relates social integration with greater altruism).
To our knowledge, there are very few papers focussing on the link between
latent3 social networks and altruism.4
3These experiments do not create or promote social networks between participants;
they just elicit the social network existing prior to the experiment.
4We do not include here designs of the “come to the lab with your friend” type (see
Reuben [22] for an extensive discussion). Observe that these designs do not elicit a com-
plete network.
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As we will show in this section, there are two key ingredients in this liter-
ature: the network elicitation procedures and the matching process between
subjects. The latter is controlled in order to explore social issues: integration,
friendship, favoritism, etc.
Let us introduce some concepts.
Definition 1 (Fi) Network of friends is the set ({Fi}i∈N , N). In words,
each participant i declares who his/her friends are within the set N . We
denote by Fi the set of friends and by fi = |Fi| the number of friends. The
members of N not in Fi will be called strangers5 for i; the set of strangers
for i is thus: Si = N r Fi.
Example 1 F1 = {2, 3}, F2 = {1}, F3 = {1, 4}, F4 = {3}, F5 = ∅, F6 =
{2, 3}.
Figure 1 represents this network.
5Note that Si contains the set of friends of i’s friends not in Fi, or more precisely the
set of k > 1 neighbors for i, while Fi includes all k = 1 neighbors. In many cases, k = 2
for instance, these neighbors are not strangers at all (see Vega—Redondo [23]).
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Two additional definitions will be useful: the first connects the existing
literature on the dictator game with this new literature6 and the second is
based on network measures.
Definition 2 (SPi) Social proximity is a measure of the distance between
i (dictator) and j (recipient). In our context social proximity may take on
values in the interval [0, 1]: 0 (if j ∈ Si); 1 (if j ∈ Fi and the identity of the
recipient is known for sure); 1
fi
(if j ∈ Fi and the identity of the recipient is
unknown).
Definition 3 (SIi) Social integration of player i is a measure of his/her
outstanding cooperation links.
6See Dufwemberg and Muren [10] for a discussion.
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Players with high levels of social integration are involved in long-run
relationships where cooperation is sustainable. This is highly correlated with
the number of friends, or degree-out, |Fi|, and individual centrality measures.
The initial paper in this literature is undoubtedly that of Mobius, Rosen-
blat & Quoc-Anh [20] (hereafter MRQ). To elicit the social network at Har-
vard dorms MRQ use a coordination device (with monetary incentives) that
lets subjects choose friends from a list and offers a prize (with some proba-
bility) when subjects coordinate naming each other (see Table 1).7
Table 1: Network Elicitation Device
Device Population
MRQ Coordination with rewards Univ. Students
BDE Survey with benefit-your-friend Econ. Students
GMMTY Survey Fifth & Sixth Graders
BCJP Coordination with rewards + punisment Econ. Students
BCEJP Survey with benefit-your-friend Econ. Students
7A recent paper by Haan, Koreman and Riemersma [15] uses “inside” information from
teachers to elicit the social network in a group of children.
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Once the network is obtained, MRQ check whether subjects are willing
to increase their donation (in dictator games) when they are matched with a
friend as recipient. Thus, the key difference between their work and previous
dictator game literature is that they “control” the matching process (i. e.
social proximity) with precise information on the previously elicited network.
Given that they can measure the distance between subjects, they control
donations by the existing outstanding relation between them. MRQ study
whether a subject’s behavior changes when he/she faces a friend as recipient,
that is, when the level of social distance (between players) is reduced to the
minimum. This is precisely the opposite case to Hoffman et al. [17], [16],
where the individual has no information about the recipient and thus the
social distance is maximum. The result is clear:
R1: Social proximity (being matched to a friend instead of a stranger)
increases giving.
To be more precise, in one of their treatments MRQ’s subjects are in-
formed that they will be matched to a specific friend (see Table 2). From
the whole set of i’s friends, Fi, he/she will play with a precise element of
the set, j. In what follows, we denote by pi(f) the probability of i being
matched to an element in Fi and by pi(j) the probability of being matched
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to a specific element. Under this experimental design, dictators know their
recipients’ identity and typically, they also have information about personal
characteristics (for instance, their income, their needs, etc.) that may affect
social proximity.
Table 2: Matched to a friend
pi(f) pi(j)
MRQ 1 1
BDE 1 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1
GMMTY explores ALL cases
BCJP 0 ≤ pi(f) ≤ 1 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1
BCEJP 0 or 1 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1
MRQalso deal with the topic of social integration. They define a clustering—
related measure (named strength) based on connected friends: it is an index
which captures the number of friends that two individuals share. Concerning
social integration they obtain a second crucial result:
R2: Social integration (as measured by the strength of the link) increases
generosity.
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In sum, MRQ show that the greater the social integration and the greater
the social proximity, the greater the level of donations.
Given MRQ’s matching mechanism there are two other variables mixed
with social proximity and social integration that could be driving the results.
First, the design does not enable a distinction to be made as to whether
subjects give more because the recipient is a close friend or simply because
they know the recipient’s identity and his/her personal characteristics.
Note in this respect that very recent literature shows that dictator giving
is extremely sensitive to information regarding the recipient’s identity (see
Charness and Gneezy [9] or Frohlich et al. [13]) and his/her attributes (see
Brañas-Garza [2]). Second, since dictators know the recipient’s identity, there
is room for reciprocity: players could obtain ex-post benefits from their
donations (see Rabin [21]).
Brañas-Garza, Durán & Espinosa [3] (BDE) partially solve these prob-
lems regarding the information about the recipient. To obtain Fi for each
player i, subjects are asked (using a different elicitation device,8 see Table
8The benefit-your-friend incentive device: subjects were asked to write down the name
of their classmate friends who “may have the chance to benefit later in the experiment”.
No information was provided about the type of decisions they would make afterwards.
The instructions clearly stated that they might be given the chance to benefit only one of
their friends (randomly chosen) so that the more friends they listed, the lower the chance
of benefiting any particular individual was.
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1) for a list of their close friends. Once the whole social network is obtained
each subject is matched to a friend —as in MRQ— with the only difference
that they do not know with whom; dictators know only that they will play
with a friend in Fi (which implies pi(f) = 1 and 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1, see Table
2). Then they are informed that they will play with any randomly chosen
close friend, that is any element of Fi. Observe that although pi(f) = 1 the
probability of being matched with a specific friend j is less than 1, in par-
ticular pi(j) = 1/fi, with fi being the total number of friends.9 In contrast,
the baseline treatment comprises dictators playing with strangers.
Note that pi(j) ≤ 1 implies on the one hand that reciprocity has less
importance since the dictator does not know exactly who the recipient is
(and therefore obtaining ex-post benefits is made more difficult), and on the
other hand it eliminates the effect that knowledge of the recipient’s identity
may have on the dictator. Interestingly, even though direct reciprocity and
knowledge of identity are removed, there is still a friendship effect in BDE,
in a similar direction to that reported by MRQ:
R1’: In the absence of direct reciprocity, social proximity increases giving.
9p(j) = 1 only for those subjects with fi = 1.
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Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell, Tromp & Yariv (2006) (GMMTY) con-
ducted a survey among 10-12 year old girls in Pasadena, eliciting friendship
relations among these fifth and sixth graders (see Table 1) as well as a large
number of personal attributes. An interesting feature is that subjects play 10
different dictator game decisions with recipients at different social distances
—from the dictators— although only one of the decisions is implemented (ran-
domly).
As in MRQ the matching mechanism explores different relations between
players: friends, friends of friends and greater social distances. This pro-
cedure allows proximity to be graduated more accurately and enables the
effect of spatial measures of intensity of relations on generosity to be ana-
lyzed. Their study of giving as a function of distance between players yields
a clear result: there are large and significant effects of (social) distance on
giving. They also control for the dictator’s personal features (such us popu-
larity, shyness, race, height, etc.) and conclude that social distance variables
are much more important than personal variables.10 In short,
R1”: Controlling for personal features, the shorter the social distance
the greater the giving. Social proximity has higher predictive power than
10GMMTY also explore the importance of personal variables for network formation.
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dictators’ personal attributes.
Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Espinosa, Jiménez & Ponti [5] (BCEJP) ex-
plore the effect of social integration, measured through several network in-
dexes, on dictator giving. This paper elicits a social network within a group
of students pursuing a BA in Economics (see Table 1) which is later used
to analyze altruism in terms of dictator giving.11 The matching mechanism
is controlled in order to create two specific environments: subjects may face
either friends or strangers (see Table 2) but even in the first case subjects
do not know the identity of the recipient, that is, pi(j) is positive but not
equal to one.12 The elicitation of the latent social network allows to measure
social integration using standard network indexes —see Vega—Redondo [23]:
clustering,13 degree14 and betweenness15 (a centrality measure). This paper
obtains a salient result:
R2”: Social integration (as measured by betweenness) is positively re-
11Brañas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Jiménez & Ponti [4] (BCJP) provide a detailed discussion
about experimental procedures for network elicitation. They compare simple devices,
such as surveys, with other more sophisticated ones such as the benefit-your-friend device,
reward+punishment coordination games, etc.
12An exception is an individual who reveals that everyone else is his/her friend: fi = n−1
then pi(f) = 1 but pi(j) takes the minimum value 1n−1 .
13A measure of the likelihood that two friends of the subject in a node are friends of
each other.
14The count of the number of ties to other agents in the network.




This result is relevant because it separates the pure effect of social inte-
gration from the effect of reciprocity and the friendship effect. It shows that
with no potential gains in terms of reciprocity, more integrated individuals
are willing to cooperate more. In short, social integration seems to have a
positive effect on giving which is independent from reciprocity and from the
friendship effect. This is interesting in the sense that in a setting where there
is no room for strategic behavior, at least in the short term, individuals with
high social integration find it in their interest to be generous.16
3 Puzzles
The above literature reports some alternative sources of social giving: whereas
GMMTY, MRQ and BDE support the friendship effect (social proximity),
which explains why individuals always help those subjects linked to them,
BCEJP focus on social integration regardless of social proximity.
To shed some light on this question, we use previous experimental data
(BDE) but control for social integration and other variables regarding the
16It is worth noting that an alternative measure of social integration, degree—out, turns
out not to be statistically significant in explaining giving. In this respect see also the
discussion at the end (Section 4).
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matching mechanism. In the BDE design, after the network elicitation stage
individuals play a dictator game either with a randomly chosen friend or with
a stranger. The subjects know whether pi(f) = 1 or pi(f) = 0; however, they
do not have information about the recipient’s identity, 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1.
We use the following explanatory variables:
• Social Proximity: pi(f) is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if
the subject faces a friend for sure or 0 whenever he/she faces a stranger.
• Social Integration: fi or degree− out is the number of friends that the
individual has in the network, i.e. the number of links arising from the
subject, |Fi|.
• Reciprocity: pi(j) is the probability of being matched to a specific
friend; this variable takes the following values.
for pi(f) = 0→ pi(j) = 0
for pi(f) = 1 → pi(j) = 1fi
Table 3 presents summary statistics for the regression variables.
Using these three variables we estimate the impact of social proximity,
social integration and reciprocity on giving. As expected, there are high
correlations between variables (ρpi(f)pi(j)=0.69, ρpi(f)fi=-0.34 & ρfipi(j)=-0.32)
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which may indicate multicollinearity.
Table 3: Variables and Descriptives
Mean Median Mode Max/Min n
pi(f): Social Proximity 0.49 0 0 1/0 53
fi: Degree-out 2.79 3 4 7/0 53
pi(j): Reciprocity 0.21 0 0 1/0 53
Giving 2.96 3 0/517 6/0 53
Table 4 presents the regression results. Columns 1 to 3 explore each
variable separately. The effect of degree-out on giving is marginal and both
social proximity and reciprocity are highly significant. Also note that the
latter has a coefficient which is twice as high as that of the former.
To explore in depth the effects of reciprocity and social integration we
use pi(j), a variable which assigns value zero to those individuals who knew
they were never going to be matched to a friend and the inverse of degree-out
( 1
fi
) for subjects facing friends. Given the multicollinearity problem we must
study social proximity and reciprocity separately. Column 4 jointly explores
social proximity and integration and column 5 uses social integration and
17For subjects playing with strangers and friends respectively.
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reciprocity. The results are clear: the model presented in column 5 is highly
explanatory.
Table 4: Giving Regressions
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
c 2.48 2.55 2.68 1.72 1.80 1.61 2.57
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
pi(f) 0.98 − − 1.24 0.49 −
(0.04) (0.01) (0.44)
fi − − 0.09 0.22 0.23 0.22 −
(0.48) (0.12) (0.09) (0.07)
pi(j) − 1.92 − − 2.35 1.84 −
(0.01) (0.00) (0.07)
fi ∗ pi(f) − − − − − − 0.36
(0.02)
n 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
R
2
0.059 0.097 0.009 0.084 0.130 0.123 0.080
(*) p-values in parentheses.
Furthermore, the model presented in column 6 (with high multicollinear-
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ity) suggests that social proximity offers no additional predictive power once
social integration and reciprocity are included in the regression.
In sum, regressions 5 & 6 show that pi(j) has a positive and significant co-
efficient but pi(f) has no effect when both fi and pi(j) have been introduced.
So there is no friendship effect on giving once degree-out and reciprocity
have been taken into account. The interaction between social proximity and
integration (column 7) captures the number of friends when the subject is
playing with a friend. Note that this is an alternative measure of reciprocity
(and thus highly correlated to pi(j)) which is highly significant in explaining
giving.
These results can be interpreted as follows:
Even though a friendship effect is observed in the experimental data, this
effect is mixed with two other variables: reciprocity (the possibility of ex-post
favor trading) and social integration (the number of outstanding cooperative
links).
When fi is included in the regression to capture social integration it
is weakly significant. This is because on the one hand, when a subject is
matched to a friend reciprocity is a decreasing function of the number of
links fi, so that more isolated agents should give more. Thus, giving induced
18
by strategic reasons (by the possibility of tracing the recipient and obtaining
ex-post favors) is a decreasing function of fi. On the other hand, subjects
with higher social integration are more likely to give more since they have
outstanding long run cooperation relations. This second effect goes exactly
in the opposite direction: subjects with higher social integration have more
friends and give more.
Note that pi(j) is decreasing in degree-out (fi) and therefore pi(j) also
simultaneously contains the effect of reciprocity and the effect of social inte-
gration.
4 Discussion
This paper analyzes the determinants of giving within a social network. After
a detailed survey of this emerging literature we propose two main explanatory
variables for previous experimental results.
The first variable is strategic and is based on reciprocity, the possibil-
ity of ex-post favors (a second stage outside the lab added to the one-shot
dictator game and not controlled by the experimenter). The second is the
level of social integration measured by degree-out.
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In our data set both these variables are highly and positively correlated
to giving, with the former being more significant in the regression analysis.
The reason why our measure of integration seems to be less relevant than
reciprocity is that its relation with giving might not be linear. To illustrate
this idea consider the most extreme cases in terms of socialization: i) the
most integrated subject, i.e. a subject who has links with all the individuals
in the network (degree − out = n − 1), and ii) the subject with the lowest
(positive) number of links in the network (that is, degree − out = 1). Our
point is that in these two salient cases individuals will tend to be particularly
generous: in the first case due to the social integration variable and in the
second due to reciprocity. Let us elaborate on this idea.
First, consider a regular dictator game in N , with pi(f) < 1 and 0 ≤
pi(j) < 1 with the most integrated individual, degree − out = n − 1. It
is easy to check that the higher the level of integration the higher pi(f) is,
i.e. pi(f) increases with fi. Then, in the extreme case of pi(f) = 1 sub-
jects know they will be playing with a friend on their list. This argument
provides an explanation for those results regarding the subject’s social inte-
gration: A highly integrated individual always matches with a friend, so that
he/she receives back part of his/her giving at least in the form of outstanding
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cooperation.
Second, the dominant variable for relatively isolated subjects is not social
integration but reciprocity. Consider an individual playing a dictator game
under the condition pi(f) = 1 and 0 < pi(j) ≤ 1. The subjects play with
friends but they do not know with whom. It is not difficult to see that the
lower the integration is the higher pi(j) is, i.e. pi(j) decreases with fi. In
the extreme case, when the subject has only one friend, fi = 1, pi(j) = 1,
we are back to MRQ conditions. When pi(j) = 1, after playing the game
these subjects may communicate with their partners and get ex-post favors
in exchange for giving. Note that the smaller the number of links is the larger
the probability of favor trading is.
This discussion provides an explanation for previous experimental results
concerning giving and social network characteristics. In fact, the economet-
ric analysis of the two variables using previous experimental data indicates
that reciprocity and social integration are positively related to giving. How-
ever, further research would be needed to establish the direction of causality
between social integration and generosity; it could be the case that more gen-
erous individuals tended also to be more socially integrated and our empirical
analysis might be capturing this positive association.
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